INTRODUCTION
This article explores the legal framework around the process of 'default management' and explains its significance in the setting of central clearing. It finds that, even in a context where robust default management is of systemic importance to the financial system and the law is generally supportive, material risks remain and must be accounted for.
One of the principal objectives of financial contracts is to allow creditors to manage a defaulting counterparty in a way which is effective, predictable and legally binding. One way in which this is achieved is by affording creditors a suite of contractual rights when defined 'Events of Default' are triggered. These events are amongst the most commonly negotiated terms of financial contracts and, as a minimum, include the non-payment of any sums due under the contract.
1 While a breach of contract normally entitles the innocent party to claim for damages, an Event of Default triggers a predetermined contractual scheme allowing the non-defaulting party to take certain steps to protect itself. In the context of derivatives, for instance, this scheme will provide for early termination on the payment of a sum calculated by a method which may lead to the non-defaulting party paying the defaulter. 2 To supplement these contractual protections, a creditor may take proprietary rights in its counterparty's assets, often in the form of financial collateral such as cash or securities. These rights are intended to be enforceable against third parties and thereby transform a creditor's position should the counterparty become insolvent.
In practice, the rights associated with Events of Default are contingent not only on the provisions of the parties' agreement but on a fuller and more complex set of public and private legal rules governing default management. Financial law is littered with examples where parties' arrangements failed because such rules took precedence. 3 Ex ante certainty about the law of default management is therefore vital. However, as this article demonstrates, this is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve in modern financial markets. In part this is because the applicable law is piecemeal and has been subject to significant recent change, for example as special resolution regimes have been introduced. At the same time, the process of managing a default is growing more demanding operationally, for example, sometimes requiring the non-defaulting party to close out increasingly large and complex portfolios composed of the defaulter's positions. The ensuing tension between certainty and complexity matters for the counterparties themselves, but as we explain, there are also systemic concerns.
Most pressingly, as this article will show, where regulators choose to promote safe and robust markets by requiring that certain private parties manage all the defaults that occur within a sector, this tension may have financial stability implications beyond the contracting parties themselves.
Rather than considering financial contracts in the abstract, the context for this discussion is the legal framework which applies to the default processes used in central clearing. While this is a relatively specialist context, it is important, topical and, in terms of default management, paradigmatic. Central counterparties (CCPs) intermediate all the contracts in a particular market, offering various benefits 4 but, above all, acting as 'default managers' for the markets which they clear. In the wake of the global financial crisis, regulators undertook a 'deep revision of the regulation of the securities and derivatives markets'. 5 The resulting reform promulgated CCPs, partly because of their proven capacity to act as default managers. Specifically, new rules have been implemented in the G20 and beyond to mandate the use of central clearing for certain over the counter (OTC) derivatives. importantly for these purposes, it holds financial resources allowing it to act as a shock absorber for the market if a participant fails. 12 While CCPs have been a long-standing part of the financial markets, as a result of extensive post-crisis regulatory reforms they have now assumed an unprecedented role in the global economy. This transformation was triggered by the G20's statement in 2009, 13 following which regulators worldwide have already introduced, or are in the process of introducing, new laws requiring that eligible non-exchange traded or 'over the counter'
(OTC) derivatives between qualifying counterparties have to be cleared through CCPs. 14 In the EU, these reforms were implemented in 2012 by EMIR, 15 and, in the US, by Title VII of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. 16 The central objective of this clearing mandate is to reduce risk in the OTC derivatives markets. 17 This policy outcome is, in turn, entirely dependent on CCPs being robust 18 and being able to implement their default rules. Accordingly, the remainder of this section explains the legal nature of those rules, and considers their relationship with insolvency law. 12 Evidence of the 'shock absorber' effect in action was provided by the . 17 See the G20 Leaders' Statement, n 13 supra; European Commission 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories' (Brussels COM 2010) 484/5, 6, describing the 'final objective' of the clearing obligation as 'reducing risk in the financial system', and the Recitals to EMIR, including Recital 15, explaining that the driver for mandatory central clearing is that it 'reduces systemic risk'. 18 The objectives of the clearing mandate require a CCP itself to be robust, which explains why this reform has been accompanied by extensive reforms to the rules for the authorisation and supervision of CCPs, e.g. in Titles III and IV of EMIR. There is a large literature analysing the organisational and economic aspects of the robustness of CCPs, including discussing how to safeguard CCPs' liquidity. 
Default rules
Parties which face a CCP directly are known as clearing members. To become a member, applicants must meet operational and financial criteria, such as minimum net capital 19 and members must continue to comply with these criteria throughout their membership. Due to the demands of being a member, such as providing and moving collateral on CCP deadlines, many parties wishing to clear OTC derivatives will do so as clients of clearing members rather than becoming members themselves. 20 While there is considerable uniformity in the clearing agreements between the CCP and its members, this does not carry over to client clearing agreements. Partly for this reason, and partly for reasons of space we do not discuss client clearing further in this article.
Once accepted, the member enters into a contract with the CCP. This incorporates the clearing house's rulebook, which details the technical processes involved in the clearing relationship. The rulebook contains the CCP's default rules, which provide the circumstances when members can be declared in default, and the procedures which will apply once a default notice is served.
As with all contracts, there is potentially a risk that this agreement may be declared void for reasons including one party's lack of capacity, or disrupted by vitiating factors or by claims that the terms have been varied or waived by oral agreement. In particular, the history of the bilateral (uncleared) derivatives markets has been punctuated by claims brought by non-financial counterparties that certain complex products were ultra vires. 21 However, given that the membership of clearing houses is, for the moment, dominated by sophisticated financial institutions, this risk seems minimal as regards the CCP.
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The more significant risk is that a member claims that its terms with the CCP have 22 However, non-financial counterparties will make up a significant part of the membership of commodities CCPs, and there are also proposals to broaden the membership of repo clearing services to include non-financial counterparties, as discussed in K Devasabai, 'CME and LCH.Clearnet prep buyside repo clearing' Risk (30 January 2015).
litigation turning on whether a conference call constituted a binding agreement by brokers to liquidate the trader's positions in a co-ordinated way. This allegation was denied by the brokers, who had each closed-out as they thought fit. Though the Court of Appeal ultimately found that the ingredients for a binding contract were not met and therefore there was no agreement to close out in a co-ordinated way, 23 the fact that the case proceeded so far illustrates the importance of the CCP establishing clear contractual arrangements before they are needed, and strictly adhering to them once they are.
Financial resources
CCPs hold financial resources to absorb the losses which result from a member's default.
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The collection and availability of this collateral, and certainty about a CCP's proprietary rights in these assets are fundamental to the operation of a CCP. 25 
CCPs and insolvency law
One, but not the only, reason that clearing members default is that they are insolvent or heading that way. As a result, a CCP may have to manage a default concurrently with an insolvency regime. This section discusses the extent to which this may constrain a CCP in practice.
In England, there are numerous insolvency regimes which might apply to a failing or failed company. One analysis has suggested that a company incorporated as a bank in
England could be subject to any one of eleven different types of insolvency procedure. 38 We focus here on formal insolvency proceedings, which are either an administration or a winding operations, including its default rules. 57 However, it is not the 'cure all' it is sometimes taken for; it is by no means designed to exempt all activities of a CCP from all conflicting law.
Rather, Part VII should be seen as being reinforced by various other legislative provisions.
There are two main sets of legislation which supplement Part VII to protect a CCP's default management processes. The first is the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality) Regulations 1999/2979 ('SFR'), which implement the Settlement Finality Directive 1998/26/EC. The Directive aims to provide a consistent Europe-wide treatment of the process of settling a financial transaction, including where one of the system's participants becomes insolvent. The SFR apply to designated 'systems', and it is now a requirement of Article 17(4) of EMIR that any authorised CCP has to be designed a 'system' for this purpose.
Regulation 14 of the SFR sets out the principle that the proceedings (broadly defined, and including 'default arrangements') of a designated system will take precedence if inconsistent with insolvency law; later regulations disapply specific provisions of the Insolvency Act.
Importantly, there is specific modification of the law of insolvency with respect to a 'collateral security charge and the actions taken to enforce such a charge'.
58 52 Broadly defined in Part VII, s 155 and including contracts between a recognised clearing house and its members. 53 Defined in Part VII, s 173 as a 'charge, whether fixed or floating, granted … in favour of a recognised clearing house, for the purpose of securing debts or liabilities arising in connection with their ensuring the performance of market contracts …' 54 Addressed in Part VII, s 177, which covers margin in relation to a market contract or default fund contribution. 55 'Default rules' is defined by Part VII, s 188 of and this definition is discussed further in section 3.1.2 infra. 56 These other exemptions relate to the settlement of market contracts not dealt with under default rules, and porting of client positions and assets on the default of a member. 57 Part VII principally facilitates a recognised clearing house's default proceedings by modifying insolvency law. However, Part VII also assists default proceedings in other ways, e.g. section 160 imposes a duty to assist with a recognised clearing house's default proceedings on any person who has or had control of the defaulter's assets, or who has or had documents relating to a defaulter. 58 
Conclusion
If market participants did not default, there would be no need for CCPs. CCPs deploy detailed contractual procedures, backed up with financial resources, in order to manage defaults safely and prevent contagion to the rest of the market. The importance of this function of CCPs has been heightened by regulatory reform the wake of the last financial crisis, justifying CCPs' special legislative treatment. Part VII and the SFR, coupled with the more general provisions of the FCAR, combine to create a supportive, if piecemeal, regime for CCPs' default management processes. Against this background, the following section evaluates the extent to which material risks remain, whether from shortcomings in safe harbour legislation, or from other types of legal challenge. 59 Each term is separately defined in FCAR, Regulation 3.
LEGAL ISSUES ALONG A DEFAULT TIMELINE

Declaration of default
The declaration of clearing member default lays the foundation for the procedures which follow, and certainty is therefore paramount. An incorrect or inaccurate declaration may compromise the CCP's own actions and, because it could trigger cross-default provisions 60 in other contracts, or discourage other parties from dealing with the member, or possibly tip a member into insolvency, it might also expose the CCP to a sizeable claim for damages.
There are three principal challenges for the CCP at this stage which, respectively, involve contractual interpretation, careful navigation of the relevant legislative provisions, and awareness that the right to call an Event of Default may be stayed if a member is affected by a special resolution regime. The following explores these issues in more detail.
Contractual compliance
Typically, the Events of Default defined in a CCP's membership agreement will include nonpayment of any sums due from the member, a breach of the agreement, the initiation of insolvency procedures variously defined, and regulatory action being taken against the member. 61 Such lists are often supplemented by 'catch-all' terms. For example, the CCP may be allowed to call a default if it is 'necessary or desirable for our own protection' 62 or in the event of the member 'appearing to the Clearing House to be unable, or to be likely to become unable, to meet its obligations in respect of one or more Contracts'. 63 It is also common for Events of Default to include grace periods, notice periods and other formalities which must be observed before a default can be declared.
The declaration of default may appear to be a simple step, however, the litigation around the close out of Fluxo-Cane Overseas Limited's positions in exchange traded sugar derivatives demonstrates that there can be pitfalls. In one of several English cases concerning 60 A cross-default clause in contract X means that if a borrower defaults on other financial indebtedness it will also be a default under X. In practice, these clauses are heavily negotiated and vary as to materiality thresholds, de minimis amounts, grace periods and so on. 61 these events 64 Fluxo-Cane argued that one of its brokers had prematurely begun the liquidation of its positions at a time when it had no right to do so. After a lengthy review of the Terms of Business between the parties the judge ultimately found that the broker was not entitled to rely on the most obvious Event of Default in this case (the non-payment of margin) because the contract required the failure to pay to continue for 'one Business Day' from Fluxo-Cane being given 'notice of non-performance'. As this period had not elapsed before the broker took action to liquidate the positions, there was not a valid Event of Default on this ground at the relevant time. 65 Though the broker stated in court that 'the only default that he had in mind at the time of sending out the default letter was non-payment of margin', it also contended that there were in fact other valid Events of Default at the relevant time. However, a number of attempts to point to a valid Event of Default also proved unsuccessful. For instance, an Event of Default for non-payment of indebtedness when due was also held not to be triggered at the time that the liquidation started, with the judge finding that it would be wrong to allow this clause to bypass the notice provisions in the non-payment of margin Event of Default. 66 Similarly, the judge held that the broker could not rely on a cross-default clause, which it had submitted was triggered by findings in a parallel case between FluxoCane and another broker. This, the judge held, would lead to too much 'commercial uncertainty'.
67
The broker was saved, however, by the judge's finding that other Event of Defaults had been triggered before liquidation commenced. The first valid Event of Default was the term covering the situation where Fluxo-Cane 'disaffirms, disclaims or repudiates any obligations under the agreement'. The judge held this happened at a meeting between FluxoCane and its brokers before the liquidation commenced. 68 The second was a broad term which allowed the broker to close out if 'necessary or desirable for our own protection'. 69 However, before being able to rely on either Event of Default, the broker had to persuade the judge that it did not matter that they were not expressly relied upon at the time of the liquidation. This argument succeeded, but with the judge noting the 'exceptional' circumstances of this close out.
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This narrow victory demonstrates that, even where standardised contract terms may be in use, it can be very difficult to observe notice and grace periods as a default actually unfolds. It also shows that cross-default clauses may not help as anticipated. In this light, a CCP would be well-advised to minimise or standardise drafting providing for notice periods and, secondly, to ensure that its 'fire drills' practise these aspects of declaring defaults. The primary purpose of Events of Default is to allow the CCP to act with speed and certainty, and this objective will be wholly undermined if the foundational step is called into dispute.
Statutory safe harbours: Defaults, coverage and inconsistencies
It is not enough that the CCP has valid contractual grounds to call an Event of Default.
Given the likelihood that a defaulting member will be insolvent, or near-insolvent, it is also important that the CCPs' actions fall within the available statutory protections from This definition therefore includes, but is broader than, 'default rules' under Part VII.
As a result, a procedure may qualify as a 'default arrangement' but not as a 'default rule' under Part VII.
As with Part VII, the SFR protect more than just default arrangements. The pivotal regulation in this respect is Regulation 14 (which sets out the principle that the 'proceedings' of a designated system will take precedence if inconsistent with insolvency law). Regulation 14(1) expressly lists the contracts covered by this provision, including 'a transfer order', 'the default arrangements of the designated system', 'the rules of a designated system as to the settlement of transfer orders not dealt with under its default arrangements' and 'a contract for the purpose or realising collateral security in connection with participation in a designated system or in a system which is an interoperable system in relation to that designated system the public register, access to a trading venue, non-financial counterparties, and risk mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives contracts no cleared by a CCP. narrowest. In such a sensitive area of law, such inconsistency is undesirable as it may lead to delay and uncertainty.
There are also more specific concerns about these definitions. Most importantly, in both Part VII and the SFR, the definitions of 'default rules' and 'default arrangements'
(respectively) require that the defaulter is unable or likely to become unable to meet its obligations to the CCP. Both definitions therefore cover narrower sets of rules than the default rules as they will be defined by some CCPs' membership agreements. This gap may be significant in practice. Events of Default, so that as soon as the defaulting party failed to meet them, the CCP would have the right to declare a default at the same time as the stay under section 48Z expired. This would be cleaner than having to argue that a right to declare the original Event of Default was stayed at the time, but was now no longer suspended.
Special resolution regimes and Events of Default
Section 48Z and the equivalent drafting in the FCAR are part of the special resolution regime and not captured by the modifications of 'insolvency law' for CCPs in the safe harbours discussed above. The result is that a CCP's default procedures would, under certain conditions, have to give way to the special resolution regime. This is a significant development for CCPs and an important qualification to their otherwise extensive protections from conflicting law. Having a member in special resolution will therefore present an unfamiliar set of circumstances for a CCP. The CCP may have to take advice on the definition of 'substantive obligations' as events unfold, and then act promptly if and when such obligations cease to be met.
Close out
Once a default is declared, Article 48 of EMIR states that a CCP must take prompt action to contain losses and liquidity pressures resulting from defaults and shall ensure that the closing out of any clearing member's positions does not disrupt its operations or expose the non-defaulting clearing members to losses that they cannot anticipate or control.
In other words, the CCP has to close out the defaulter's cleared portfolio, while managing its own risks and liquidity and containing the effects of the default.
'Close out' is a standard feature of both cleared and uncleared derivatives contracts.
As Gloster LJ explained in Videocon Global Ltd v Goldman Sachs International
[t]he purpose of these [close out] provisions is to provide a contractual mechanism for (a) calculating the amount due upon the (early) termination of multiple transactions -as a single payment due from one party to another; and (b) facilitating the prompt payment of such amount.
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The attraction of close out provisions is that the parties agree in advance how the contract may be valued and terminated once a default happens, thereby avoiding the need to wait for a breach and then sue for damages or other remedies. 87 and so the extensive case law on the ISDA terms provides important insights into the types of challenges that a CCP may face from a defaulting member.
Interpreting contractual close out provisions
Case law on the ISDA Master Agreement shows that the close out process may prove to be contestable, even where very detailed schemes are provided in the contract. This is especially likely where a default unfolds in dysfunctional market conditions.
Challenges of this kind will often come down to interpreting the parties' contractual language. In the English courts, the process of contractual interpretation takes its starting 
Reasonableness
A non-defaulting party closing out a derivatives contract may also face a challenge that it has not acted in a way that is reasonable. A challenge may be based on express contractual wording, i.e., where the agreement expressly requires actions to be 'reasonable', or on the common law duty to exercise discretion in a reasonable, or rational, way. capriciously or unreasonably. It followed that Robinson, in using Market Quotation rather than Loss, acted unreasonably and in breach of contract.
The same test informs a different type of challenge to the close out process, based on the common law rather than express contractual language. A principle has emerged in the common law that, where a contract gives one party discretion to take a decision which affects the other, the decision-maker must exercise its discretion in a reasonable or 'rational' way. 104 This has been held to mean that the party's discretion is limited, again following Wednesbury,
by an implied term that it would not be exercised 'dishonestly, for an improper purpose, capriciously or arbitrarily'. 105 As reflected in recent case law, this principle is particularly relevant in the close out context because a determining party will usually be required to exercise discretion at several different points in the process.
In one line of cases addressing non-defaulting parties' duties during close out, the courts have described the implications of this test as follows. There are 'parameters' defining the range of values which might be arrived at if the valuation exercise is conducted 'honestly and rationally' and within those parameters the valuing party 'is entitled to have an entirely
proper regard for any danger to itself from valuing too optimistically'. 106 In other words, subject to this duty of rationality, the decision is that of the valuing party, not the market or the court. 107 Euroption v SEB 108 confirmed that the valuing party could act in their own interests rather than the defaulter's. Here, the court found that a reasonable person acting reasonably could have closed-out as SEB did, even though this did not maximise value for The duty of rationality should therefore be seen by CCPs as a standard to be observed whenever exercising discretion, which will be inevitable during a close out. In particular, it should be carefully factored in where the CCP is closing out in unprecedented or otherwise challenging market conditions. However, the standard should not ordinarily be unduly onerous to meet. It does not prevent a CCP from acting in its own interests when closing out, and nor does it allow the court to second-guess the process. In short, if a CCP complies with its contractual obligations and exercises its discretion in a way that is 'honest and rational', it is fully entitled to protect its own interests during the default management process and a challenge based on the duty of rationality seems unlikely to be successful.
CCP-specific issues
In addition to the general challenges considered above, there are several specific issues arising in the context of a close out by a CCP.
First, section 184 of Part VII gives CCPs an indemnity for liability for loss or damage from specified acts. For instance, Section 184(3) protects CCPs and their officers and employees from liability in damages for anything done or omitted 'in the discharge or purported discharge' of '…its default rules', but there is a proviso, 'unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith'. Bad faith includes, but is broader than dishonesty, and has been described in a different context as including 'sharp practice' which may fall short of 'outright dishonesty'. 111 As with commercial reasonableness, transparency and good record-keeping of default management decisions and executions will assist here.
Secondly, one of the rare CCP-specific cases from the English courts demonstrates 'very shortly' after the appointment of administrators. The purpose of the application was to force disclosure so that the administrators could consider if there were grounds for bringing proceedings. The case was made more complex by extra-territorial aspects, but essentially the court held that difference between the close out prices and screen quotations for the same positions one day later was not something that warranted being investigated further. In particular, it was not sufficient to justify the administrators' far-reaching request for information about the close out.
Thirdly, a special feature of close out by CCPs is that a CCP's terms may provide for an auction of the defaulting member's positions. A successful auction will establish a close out valuation and find another member to take on the defaulter's contracts. Auctions are a relatively new feature of CCPs' default management processes and CCPs usually retain the flexibility to organise them in a variety of ways. In some cases, for example, members may be incentivised to provide good bids by rules stating that, after the auction, should there be losses to meet from the default fund, the contributions of members who have not submitted acceptable bids will be used before those of members who have. 113 CCPs also sometimes organise auctions where they have discretion about who can participate. As with other aspects of close out, therefore, a CCP will have not only to comply with the terms of its agreement with members and but also exercise its discretion in a rational way, as discussed above.
Collateral management
If, after the close out process outlined above, the CCP faces losses caused by the default of a member, it will seek to recover them by using the available financial resources, starting with the defaulter's collateral. Despite the safe harbours in Part VII, the SFR and the FCAR, complexities and some risks in this process remain. This section discusses the forms of collateral accepted by CCPs and then examines three areas of concern around the use of this collateral, explaining how CCPs may respond.
Forms of collateral
Cash and high quality securities are the standard forms of margin accepted by CCPs. 114 Cash is typically provided by members to the CCP using a title transfer. This means that outright ownership of the cash is transferred, with the member having a contractual right to redelivery of agreed amounts when its debt is discharged. The underlying technical arrangements for the transfer of cash are relatively simple: cash is posted to the CCP by book entry, often by using a 'concentration bank' where both member and CCP hold accounts. In this case, the clearing agreement will often give the CCP the right to make a debit transfer from the member's account direct.
The legal and operational issues surrounding the use of securities as collateral are more complex. Modern securities are held in electronic and, therefore, intermediated form.
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In English law, the concept of a trust is normally used to characterise the links in the custody chain between the central securities depositary, custodians, sub-custodians and the ultimate investor. 116 As Gullifer puts it, describing the use of the trust to analyse these tiers of intermediaries, the 'position in English law is an example of the use of existing concepts'.
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The use of the trust means that an investor's interests in securities will be held by its custodian as trustee for the investor, and so on along the chain. and (3) 124 The main attraction here is that, should a client's CCP member fail, its assets could be 'ported' or transferred to a solvent member with more speed and certainty than if those assets were in a commingled client account.
The combination of intermediation and various degrees of commingling and segregation along the chain of interests in securities creates a complex, if reasonably efficient, system of securities holding. In this context, careful drafting of collateral arrangements between CCP and member is required to ensure that both parties enjoy exactly the rights they intend to rely upon. The various risks examined next are particularly noteworthy in this context.
Fixed and floating charges
A CCP may take either a fixed or a floating charge over a member's financial collateral. The defining feature of the latter is the chargor retains control over the collateral until such point as the charge 'crystallises' or fixes to the asset, for example on a default. 125 Until then, the chargor may sell, lease, dispose of, or otherwise deal with the asset. This contrasts with a fixed charge, where the chargor requires the chargee's consent to deal with the charged asset.
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There is a risk, which is more acute where the collateral consists of intangible assets such as intermediated securities, that a court may recharacterise a collateral arrangement as a floating charge. This can happen even when the parties' agreement gives the charge a 123 The LSOC was adopted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) by the following rule, which also discusses in detail the benefits of the LSOC model compared to other types of segregation: 77(25) Fed. Reg. 6336 (February 7, 2012 The FCAR expressly protect 'security financial collateral arrangements', which are General agrees with the line taken by the English courts that 'being in the possession or under the control of the collateral taker must mean that the collateral taker not only has practical control over the account to which the collateral relates, but also has the right to prevent the withdrawal of cash by the collateral provider in so far as is necessary to guarantee the necessary obligations.' 143 In the absence of such 'legal control', the arrangement in question would therefore fall outside the financial collateral regime, as the Advocate General indicated was likely in the matter before the ECJ on this occasion.
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In practice, if intermediated securities remain in an account in the name of the CCP at the CSD (as illustrated in (Figure 1 ) supra) and the member only has the right to substitute or withdraw 'excess' collateral, which is defined in the contract, 145 without the permission of the taker, the risk of a floating charge falling outside the FCAR will be minimised. On the other hand, if the member retains more extensive rights over the collateral, this may introduce uncertainty on this very important point. The default rule for property rights is that the applicable law will be that of the place where the property is located (lex situs). This rule is straightforward to apply with traditional forms of securities. For bearer instruments, for example, the governing law would be the law of the physical location of the securities. The situation is not straightforward, however, where there is a chain of interests in securities represented by book entries in accounts, and this problem continues to command a good deal of attention from stake holders.
Conflicts of law
One approach to this problem that has gained traction in financial markets legislation is 'PRIMA', or the application of the law of the 'place of the relevant intermediary account'.
This approach determines the law of each link in the intermediated holding chain by looking at the relationship between account holder and account provider. The PRIMA approach was adopted by the Hague Conference, 146 and in slightly different form by the FCAR and the SFR. 147 It ensures that only one law governs securities in each account. The shortcomings of the approach, however, include that it may be difficult to agree where an account is maintained in some cases, and that different governing laws will apply to different parts of the chain of interests in securities. Moreover, choice of law rules such as PRIMA do not harmonise the underlying substantive laws, so they do not ensure that a given process is treated in the same way in all jurisdictions. 148 There has, of course, been some progress on harmonisation of substantive law relating to securities at an EU level. The FCD has achieved regional harmonisation of rules relating to collateralisation, further underlining the point made above that it will be very important to ensure that a CCP's collateral arrangements are covered by this regime. Moreover, while UNIDROIT developed the Geneva Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities to address many of the issues we have discussed, 149 it has not yet been signed by any states apart from Bangladesh. Therefore, despite some regional progress, the substantive rules governing interests in securities remain fragmented, creating the potential for incompatibility and uncertainty.
Notice and knowledge
A CCP's rights over collateral may also be compromised by its notice or knowledge of certain facts, for example, if it is aware that a member is using client assets as its own or of other breaches of duty along the intermediated chain. A CCP may, as a result, find itself liable to third parties (e.g., the clients of clearing members) for personal and proprietary claims.
'Notice' determines 'whether a person takes property subject to or free from some equity'. 150 In particular, in this context, if assets transferred to the CCP were the traceable proceeds of misused client funds and if the CCP had notice of the wrongdoing, the client may have a proprietary remedy against the financial resources held by the CCP. Notably, the test for having notice is broader than actual notice, i.e., a party may have constructive notice of a fact where it failed to make the proper inquiries 'suggested by the facts at his disposal'.
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The consequences of 'knowledge' are different, but also potentially severe, as it may mean that a party is held personally liable as a constructive trustee. For a CCP, it may lead to liability for knowing receipt, which is established where the defendant beneficially receives property (such as financial collateral) disposed of in breach of fiduciary duty and has knowledge that the assets it received are traceable to such a breach. 152 A CCP in this case would be liable to compensate the beneficiary (e.g., the client of the member) for its losses from the member's breach of trust. As the client's claim against the CCP would be a personal respects, fragile legal framework which has been further complicated by extensive post-crisis regulatory reforms, including new rules imposing the clearing mandate, reforming the insolvency and resolution regimes, and overhauling the regime for the governance of CCPs.
The analysis above also demonstrates how this legal framework is variously affected by developments in different parts of the financial system. In some respects, as in the case of the implied duty of rationality, case law from other sectors opens up new risks for CCPs. In other respects, such as in the design of close out valuations, CCPs may draw valuable lessons from more battle-tested markets.
Ultimately, we have shown that even in a context where parties are highly sophisticated, deploy standard terms, draw on case law from other markets and enjoy some of the most extensive safe harbours in the financial system, there remains the potential for legal challenge on various grounds. CCP default management procedures are, after all, a complex part of a complex industry. As we have explained, some challenges may be mitigated by the parties' careful drafting, for example of collateral arrangements over intermediated securities, of Events of Default notice periods, and of the CCP's right to exercise discretion. Further, CCP 'fire drills' should include operational details such as giving appropriate notice because by so doing, CCPs will mitigate some of the legal pitfalls associated with the basic contractual aspects of default management.
Other challenges, however, are for legislators. These challenges arise primarily because the legislation governing this aspect of the financial market infrastructure has become highly piecemeal. The diverse definitions of default rules, the meaning of 'substantive obligations' for the purpose of the stays of contractual rights during resolution and the gaps in the financial collateral regime remain matters for law-makers to address, and for CCPs and their members to navigate as vigilantly as possible in the meantime.
